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New York No-Fault Automobile Insurance
Work Loss Benefit Computation - A
Comparative Analysis
I. Introduction
Each year automobile accidents are responsible for a large
number of personal injuries.' As a result, many injured victims
are unable to work and, therefore, lose their income." To address
this problem, New York enacted section 671(1)(b)5 in 1974 as
part of the New York Comprehensive Automobile Insurance
Reparations Act." This so-called "work loss" provision was in-
tended to compensate victims for the actual loss of earnings
caused by disabilities resulting from automobile accidents, with-
out providing victims with a windfall or requiring extensive judi-
cial intermediation.5
The New York work loss law is one of the most comprehen-
sive of the twenty-four work loss laws.' However, since the New
York no-fault system is compulsory7 and, as such, a condition
1. See STATE OF NEW YoRu INSURANCR DEPARTMENT, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE ...
FOR WHOSE BENrr? 3, 4 (1970) [hereinafter cited as REPORT TO GOvERNOR].
2. J. O'CoNNELL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY AND THE REMEDY OF No-FAULT INSURANCE
143-44 (1971). Forty cents of every dollar of compensation stemming from an automobile
accident is paid to compensate for lost income. Id.
3. N.Y. INS. LAw § 671(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). See aLso State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brooks, 78 A.D.2d 456, 435 N.Y.S.2d 419 (4th Dep't 1981) (dis-
cussing the purpose of the work loss law).
4. Comprehensive Automobile Insurance Reparations Act, ch. 13, 1973 N.Y. Laws 10
(codified as amended at N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 670-678 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984)).
5. See Kurcsics v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 451, 403 N.E.2d 159, 426
N.Y.S.2d 454 (1980); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brooks, 101 Misc. 2d
704, 421 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1979) rev'd on other grounds, 78
A.D.2d 456, 435 N.Y.S.2d 419 (4th Dep't 1981).
6. For a list of the 24 state laws, see infra note 58.
7. The Motor Vehicle Financial Security Act of 1956, N.Y. VEH. & TRAP. LAW §§
310-321 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1983) supplemented existing legislation, namely the
Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act of 1941 N.Y. VEH. & TEA. LAw §§ 330-368
(McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1983-1984). Section 312 conditions registration of a motor ve-
hicle upon proof of financial security by insurance, bond or deposit of security. In some
states such as Virginia and South Dakota, no-fault insurance is not mandatory;, a motor-
ist may "add-on" no-fault protection to other liability coverage. Thus, in these states a
1
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precedent to the registration of a motor vehicle,8 damage awards
must be carefully scrutinized. Excessive awards inevitably result
in higher premiums, which create a hardship for motorists who
are required to purchase such insurance. Alternatively, if dam-
age awards are too small, victims are left without a source from
which they may be adequately compensated for their loss.10
This Comment recommends changing the New York work
loss law in order to accommodate more fully the conflicting no-
fault statutory goals of cost efficiency and maximum insurance
protection.1" Part II traces the development of New York's auto-
mobile insurance law, including the original formulation of the
New York no-fault law and its current work loss provisions. Part
III examines how work loss is defined. It describes how no-fault
states compute work loss benefits for unemployed, self-em-
ployed, and seasonally employed claimants. Each subsection iso-
lates the New York approach to the particular issue, and then
evaluates the alternative work loss theories presented in judicial
interpretations and New York arbitration decisions. Part IV
considers offsets to and deductions from work loss recoveries, fo-
cusing on taxation, workers' compensation, and employer-pro-
vided wage continuation plans. Part V presents the conflicting
theories regarding modifying work loss awards in light of
changed circumstances. Finally, Part VI concludes that the New
York work loss law is in need of amendment to achieve the no-
fault goals of providing an efficient and fair means of compen-
sating auto accident victims.
victim's right to sue a tortfeasor remains intact. Alternatively, many states, including
New York, have compulsory or mandatory no-fault insurance; in these states a victim is
restricted in bringing a tort action until damages exceed a certain level or injuries reach
a specified degree of severity. See King, State No-Fault Systems - Attorney's Guide
to Statutory Provisions, 4 PAcE L. REv. 297 (1984); Note, No-Fault Automobile Insur-
ance: An Analysis of the Kansas Automobile Injury Reparations Act, 20 WASHBURN L.J.
375, 380-82 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Kansas No-Fault]. See generally W. RoKES, No-
FAULT INSURANCE 127-36 (1971)) (discusses "pure" no fault in which all tort liability
would be abolished).
8. See King, supra note 7, at 354-55.
9. Kurcsics, 49 N.Y.2d at 457, 403 N.E.2d at 162, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 457.
10. See infra notes 23-41, 102, and accompanying text.




II. New York's Move from Fault to No-Fault
Before the enactment of no-fault automobile insurance in
1973,'1 New York adhered to the traditional tort liability theory
which predicated recovery on fault.'8 Under the traditional the-
ory, a victim had to prove that the alleged tortfeasor was negli-
gent 4 and that he, the victim, was free from contributory negli-
gence.'8 The original purpose of a fault system is to make the
wrongdoer pay for his wrongdoings, and thereby shift the loss
away from innocent victims.'6
To guard against liability under the fault system, drivers
purchased indemnity insurance. 7 Insurers acted only as indem-
nifiers. Thus, the insurers' liability arose only when an insured
actually paid a judgment. 8 Indemnity insurers were often re-
lieved of liability when a negligent insured was too poor to pay a
judgment. Consequently, many victims did not benefit from this
kind of insurance.1 9 In response to this inequity, many states
amended their laws to transform indemnity insurance into lia-
bility insurance, which enabled the victim to collect benefits re-
gardless of whether the negligent insured actually paid the
judgment.20
Before liability insurance was made compulsory, many vic-
tims were left without recompense for losses sustained in auto-
mobile accidents.2' This prompted New York to enact financial
responsibility laws. 2 These laws forbade drivers who had been
in an accident from driving again until they could show that
they had adequate insurance coverage to protect potential vic-
12. Comprehensive Automobile Insurance Reparations Act, ch. 13, 1973 N.Y. Laws
10 (codified as amended at N.Y. INs. LAWS §§ 670-678 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984)).
13. REPORT To GOVERNOR, supra note 1, at 44.
14. The plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant had a duty to conform to certain
standards of conduct, (2) the defendant failed to conform to the standards required, (3)
there was a causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury, and (4)
there was an actual loss or damage to the plaintiff. W. PRossER, LAw oF TORTS 143 (4th
ed. 1971).
15. Id. at 416-27.




20. Id. at 45.
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tims. 2s These financial security laws did not protect victims who
were involved in accidents with drivers who had not yet had an
accident. 4 In response to this gap in protection, New York be-
came one of the first states to make liability insurance compul-
sory in 1960.25
Compulsory liability insurance was not a talisman, and the
system remained flawed with gaps in insurance protection,
which resulted in continued hardship to many victims of auto-
mobile accidents.2" Often minor injuries were overcompensated
and serious injuries were undercompensated In addition, the
fault reparation system placed an inordinate strain on New
York's judicial resources.2"
Prompted by the growing inequity and complexity of the
"fault" system, and after much debate, 29 New York became the
fourteenth state to adopt no-fault legislation."0 Governor Rocke-
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. See also N.Y. VEH. & TRAP. LAW §§ 309-321 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1983-
1984). The legislative purpose is defined as follows:
Declaration of purpose. The legislature is concerned over the rising toll of
motor vehicle accidents and the suffering and loss thereby inflicted. The legisla-
ture determines that it is a matter of grave concern that motorists shall be
financially able to respond in damages for their negligent acts, so that innocent
victims of motor vehicle accidents may be recompensed for the injury and
financial loss inflicted upon them. The legislature finds and declares that the pub-
lic interest can best be served in satisfying the insurance requirements of this arti-
cle by private enterprise operating in a competitive market to provide proof of
financial security through the methods prescribed herein.
Id. § 310(2) (McKinney 1970).
26. For instance, if an out-of-state uninsured motorist causes an accident in New
York State, the injured party might be left without recompense. See REPORT TO GOVER-
NOR supra note 1, at 46-47.
27. Id. at 27. See also O'Connell, Auto Insurance Reform - The Reasons Why, in
FAULT OR No-FAULT, PROCEEDINGS OF A NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AUTOMOBILE INSUR-
ANCE REFORM 2 (1970).
28. REPORT TO GOVERNOR supra note 1, at 19-24.
29. See Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 49-53, 340 N.E.2d 444, 448-51, 378
N.Y.S.2d 1, 7-11 (1975); see also Special Comm. on Auto. Ins. Legis., Automobile No-
Fault Insurance, A.B.A., Feb. 1978, at 1-19 (discussing no-fault issues).
30. Thirteen other states had some kind of no-fault law prior to the effective date of
the New York law. Connecticut (effective Jan. 1973); Delaware (effective Jan. 1972);
Florida (effective Jan. 1972); Kansas (effective Jan. 1974); Maryland (effective Jan.
1973); Massachusetts (effective Jan. 1971); Michigan (effective Oct. 1973); New Jersey
(effective Jan. 1973); Oregon (effective Jan. 1972); South Dakota (effective Jan. 1972);
Texas (effective Aug. 1973); Utah (effective Jan. 1974); Virginia (effective July 1972).
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss1/4
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feller commented that the new system would ensure that every
automobile accident victim would receive compensation for sub-
stantially all his economic loss, promptly and without regard to
fault."1 He further maintained that the law would eliminate the
vast majority of automobile accident lawsuits and would provide
premium savings to New York's motorists.3 2
The New York plan is a two-prong modification of the prior
system."3 The first prong requires every owner of a motor vehicle
to purchase insurance protection against "basic economic loss,"3 4
which is refunded by the insurer without regard to fault.3 5 The
second prong imposes a limit on tort recoveries36 by proscribing
duplicate tort compensation for "basic economic loss"'37 and by
31. Governor's Memoranda, Approval of Bills, 1973 N.Y. Laws 2335 (in support of
Comprehensive Automobile Insurance Reparations Act, ch. 13, 1973 N.Y. Laws 10 (codi-
fied as amended at N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 670-678 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984))).
32. Id.
33. See Montgomery, 38 N.Y.2d at 46-48, 340 N.E.2d at 446-47, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 4-6.
34. The "work loss" provision, together with provisions for medical expenses and
miscellaneous out-of-pocket expenses, comprise "basic economic loss" which is at the
core of the New York no-fault automobile liability insurance recovery. See also N.Y. INS.
LAW § 671(1) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984):
1. "Basic economic loss" means, up to fifty thousand dollars per person:
(a) all necessary expenses incurred for: (i) medical, hospital, surgical, nurs-
ing, dental, ambulance, x-ray, prescription drug and prosthetic services;
(ii) psychiatric, physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation; (iii) any
non-medical remedial care and treatment rendered in accordance with a religious
method of healing recognized by the laws of this state; and, (iv) any other profes-
sional health services; all without limitation as to time, provided that within one
year after the date of the accident causing the injury it is ascertainable that fur-
ther expenses may be incurred as a result of the injury;
(b) loss of earnings from work which the injured person would have per-
formed had he not been injured, and reasonable and necessary expenses incurred
by such person in obtaining services in lieu of those that he would have performed
for income, up to one thousand dollars per month for not more than three years
from the date of the accident causing the injury; and
(c) all other reasonable and necessary expenses incurred up to twenty-five
dollars per day for not more than one year from the date of the accident causing
the injury.
35. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 673 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984); Montgomery, 38 N.Y.2d
at 46-47, 340 N.E.2d at 446-47, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 4-5. See also Comment, New York
Adopts No Fault: A Summary and Analysis, 37 ALB. L. REv. 662, 668 (1973).
36. See Montgomery, 38 N.Y.2d at 46-47, 340 N.E.2d at 446, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 4-5.
See also N.Y. INs. LAW § 673 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984) (abolishes tort cause of ac-
tion for damages compensable by no-fault coverage).
37. Basic economic loss includes medical expense, lost earnings and out-of-pocket
expense resulting from an injury caused by an automobile accident. N.Y. INS. LAW § 671
5
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eliminating damages for non-economic loss8 unless the victim
suffers "serious injury."39 Consequently, a victim's only source of
recompense is a statutorily created direct action against his own
insurer. Traditional actions against third parties may be pursued
only in cases of "serious injury"'4 0 or when the economic loss ex-
ceeds the monetary thresholds created by the law.4'
The work loss aspect of New York's two-prong system pro-
vides accident victims with the right to recover benefits for lost
income directly from their insurer without resort to a third party
action.42 Furthermore, the law provides several restrictions on
recoveries in order to fulfill the statutory purpose of providing
maximum benefits at a minimum cost. 43
Summary of New York Work Loss Law
Section 671(1)(b)' 4 defines work loss as those lost earnings
an injured person would have earned but for the injury, as well
as reasonable and necessary expenses incurred by an injured
person in obtaining services in lieu of those he would have per-
formed for income.45 In addition, work loss benefits shall not ex-
(McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
38. N.Y. INS. LAw § 673 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
39. Montgomery, 38 N.Y.2d at 47-48, 340 N.E.2d at 447, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 5-6.
Serious injury includes death and permanent or significant injury. Nonpermanent
injury will be a "serious injury" if the injury substantially impairs the victim's normal
daily activities for at least 90 of the 180 days immediately following the accident. Id.
40. Id. See N.Y. INs. LAW § 671(4) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
41. The victim's third party tort action also remains for economic loss in excess of
$50,000, for medical treatment expenses not ascertainable within one year of injury, for
out-of-pocket expenses in excess of $25 per day, and for work loss in excess of $1000 per
month. See Montgomery, 38 N.Y.2d at 47, 48, 340 N.E.2d at 447, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 6.
42. N.Y. INS. LAW § 671(2) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
43. Id. See also Kurcsics v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 451, 457, 403 N.E.2d
159, 162, 426 N.Y.S.2d 454, 457 (1980) (discussing the legislative purpose for reducing
benefits to account for the nontaxability of work loss benefits). See infra text accompa-
nying notes 172-75.
44. N.Y. Ins. Law § 671(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). Section 671(1)(b) pro-
vides no-fault benefits for
loss of earnings from work which the injured person would have performed had he
not been injured, and reasonable and necessary expenses incurred by such person
in obtaining services in lieu of those that he would have performed for income, up
to one thousand dollars per month for not more than three years from the date of
the accident causing the injury.
Id.
45. N.Y. INs. LAW § 671(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss1/4
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ceed $1000 per month and shall be provided for thirty-six
months from the date of the accident causing the injury."
Although section 671(1)(b) limits recoveries to $1000 per
month,7 this amount need not be prorated if the period of disa-
bility is shorter than one month." Losses are paid as they are
incurred and are overdue and subject to substantial interest
charges if not paid within thirty days after the claimant submits
proof of the loss sustained.'" If it is clear that an injury will per-
sist beyond the three year limit, an insurer has the option of
paying the victim a lump sum in full settlement of all work loss
claims.5 0
Before an insurer is required to pay benefits to a victim, the
insurer is entitled to adjust the benefits to reflect several statu-
tory offsets and deductions.5 These adjustments can be broken
down into three categories: (1) employer paid benefits which in-
clude voluntary payments by an employer5' as well as payments
pursuant to certain wage continuation plans provided by the
employer;53 (2) federal taxation, which includes an automatic
twenty percent deduction from the victim's aggregate loss of
earnings;" and (3) government insurance, which includes state
and federal workers' compensation and social security disability
laws, and New York State disability benefits."
48. Id.
47. Id. Because benefits are reduced by 20% to account for the nontaxability of
work loss, an actual loss of $1250 per month would have to be sustained to result in a
$1000 per month recovery. Kurcsics, 49 N.Y.2d 451, 403 N.E.2d 159, 426 N.Y.S.2d 454
(1980).
48. N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 65.15(n)(2)(x) (1982).
49. N.Y. INS. LAw § 675(1) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). The interest rate is two
percent per month. Id.
50. N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 65.15(n)(2)(xii) (1983). The amount payable can be
adjusted to the present value of the future benefits by using a six percent discount fac-
tor. Id.
51. See N.Y. INs. LAw § 671(2) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). See infra notes 172-75
and accompanying text. An insurer may only adjust benefits to reflect offsets and deduc-
tions that are expressly provided by the work loss statute. N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit 11, §
65.15(n)(2)(i) (1982).
52. See N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 65.15(n)(2)(i)(b) (1982).
53. N.Y. INs. LAw § 671(1)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). See also infra notes
215-36 and accompanying text.
54. N.Y. INS. LAw § 671(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). See also infra notes
176-90 and accompanying text.
55. N.Y. INs. LAw § 671(2)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). See also infra notes
19841
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After all adjustments have been completed the maximum
work loss recovery cannot exceed $36,000.5" Although disputes
regarding the computation of benefits will generally be resolved
through arbitration, the law does provide for judicial review of
arbitration determinations. 57
III. Work Loss Computation
As with the New York no-fault law, all twenty-three sister
states that presently have no-fault laws provide some form of
work loss protection.58 The coverage varies dramatically from
state to state. 9 Often similar claimants living in different states
do not receive similar benefits.60 Discrepancies among recoveries
may be attributed largely to the differing degree of importance
191-214 and accompanying text.
56. In addition to a monthly $1000 maximum, work loss benefits are also subject to
a $50,000 overall basic economic loss maximum. N.Y. INs. LAW § 671(1) (McKinney
Supp. 1983-1984). Therefore, if a victim incurs substantial medical expenses, it is quite
possible that a victim will not recover the full $36,000 under his no-fault protection. Id..
Assuming a victim has $17,000 in medical expenses, but also would otherwise be able to
collect the full $36,000 in work loss, he will be limited to total benefits of only $50,000.
See Barnhart v. Branch Motor Lines Inc., 107 Misc. 2d 47, 53-54, 433 N.Y.S.2d 370, 373
(Sup. Ct. Broome County 1980). Nevertheless, the victim who is unable to receive full
compensation for his damages from his no-fault insurance may seek recompense through
traditional tort remedies for losses in excess of statutory limits. See Montgomery, 38
N.Y.2d at 47-48, 340 N.E.2d at 447, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 5-6 (1975).
57. N.Y. INs. LAW § 675(2) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
58. Id. § 671(1)(b); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-4014(b) (1980); COLO. REv. STAT. § 10-4-
706(1)(d)(I) (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-319(b) (West Supp. 1983); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 21 § 2118(a)(2)(a)(2) (1979); D.C. CODE ANN. § 35-2104(d) (Supp. 1983); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 627.736(1)(b) (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-34-4(a)(2)(B) (1982);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 294-2(10)(C) (Supp. 1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3103(1) (1981); Ky.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 304.39-020(5)(b) (Bobbs-Merrill 1981); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A §
538(c)-(e) (1979); MAss. GEN. LAW ANN. ch. 90, § 34A (West Supp. 1984-1985); MICH.
ComI'. LAws ANN. § 500.3107(b) (1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65B.44(3) (West Supp. 1984);
N.J. STAT. ANN § 39:6A-4(b) (West Supp. 1984-1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-41-03(21)
(Supp. 1983); OR. Rav. STAT. § 743.805(b) (1981); Law of July 19, 1974, P.L. 489, No. 176
art. II § 1009.205, repealed by, Law of Feb. 12, 1984, No. 1984-11, 1984 Pa. Legis. Serv.
50 (Purdon) [hereinafter cited as Pa. Law, repealed 19841; S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-11-110
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 58-23-8(2) (1978); Tax. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 5.06-3(b) (Vernon 1981); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-41-6(1)(b)(i) (Supp.
1983); VA. CODE § 38.1-380.2(B) (Supp. 1984).
59. See King, supra note 7, at 297-403. For example, the benefits provided by the
Massachusetts law cannot exceed $2000 whereas the Michigan law provides for recov-
eries which approach $80,000. Id. at 336-37, 340.
60. Recovery often will depend on how a particular state law defines work loss. See
infra notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss1/4
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placed by lawmakers on compensating individual victims as op-
posed to maintaining low insurance premiums for the general
public.
A. The Unemployed Claimant
Perhaps the most controversial issue in the area of no-fault
work loss is the treatment of claims of the unemployed victim."
No issue in this area more plainly depicts the crucial com-
promises legislators must address in shaping no-fault policy.
Legislators have to weigh the potential for hardship to individ-
ual claimants who may not be covered with the overall cost effi-
ciency of the no-fault system.2
1. Actual vs. Anticipated Loss - A General Overview
The majority of no-fault states, including New York, tend to
define work loss narrowly.6 8 These states limit work loss benefits
to work related income that "would have" been actually earned
but for the disability, or to individuals who would have actually
been employed but for their injuries." The actual loss theory is
61. See infra notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
62. See Leonard v. Preferred Risk Ins. Co., 247 Ga. 574, 277 S.E.2d 675 (1981)
(holding it constitutional, in light of the important no-fault goals, to exclude unemployed
workers from collecting no-fault work loss benefits); see also Gambino v. Royal Globe
Ins. Co., 86 N.J. 100, 105-07, 429 A.2d 1039, 1042-43 (1981) (noting that although the no-
fault law was to be applied equitably, the system could not run efficiently if each liti-
gant's claim would involve substantial judicial intermediation); cf. Minier v. State Farm
Mut. Ins. Co., 309 Pa. Super. 53, 56, 454 A.2d 1078, 1079 (1982) (noting that Pennsylva-
nia scheme may provide work loss benefits regardless of the reason for claimant's
unemployment).
63. There are two forms which the more restrictive work loss statutes take. The first
group limits work loss to that income that "would have" been earned but for the acci-
dent, by expressly limiting work loss to that income that was "actually" lost. See CoLO.
Rav. STAT. § 10-4-706(d)(I) (1973); D.C. CODE ANN. § 35-2104(d)(1)(A) (Supp. 1983);
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 34A (West Supp. 1984-1985); MICH. Comp. LAWS §
500.3107(b) (1983); N.Y. INS. LAw § 671(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
The second group limits work loss to those victims who were "income producers" or
to those victims who would normally be gainfully employed. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 38-319(b) (West Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A § 539(a) (1979); N.D. Camr.
CODE § 26-41-03(21) (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-4(b) (West Supp. 1984-1985);
OE. Rav. STAT. § 743.805(c) (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-11-110 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1981); Tax. Rzv. Civ. STAT. Aim. § 506-3(b) (1981); VA. CODE § 38.1-380.1(b) (Supp.
1984).
64. See infra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
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predicated on the notion that the no-fault system would become
too expensive, inefficient, and unfair if all losses, regardless of
how speculative, were compensated through work loss benefits. 6
Alternatively, a few states have enacted laws that tend to
define work loss broadly." These states often recognize claims
that establish only that the victim might or could have antici-
pated earnings but for his or her injury.6 7 The anticipated loss
theory permits the recognition of claims based on probable lost
income, as opposed to actual lost income. States adhering to the
anticipated loss theory emphasize the importance of an individ-
ual victim's recovery instead of the insurance premium burden
that must be shouldered by the general public."'
Although courts generally do not expressly refer to a specific
theory when construing and applying work loss provisions, the
cases indicate that these policy considerations underlie court de-
cisions. For instance, many unemployed claimants fare well in
states adhering to the anticipated loss theory." Here courts will
often find a basis for compensating work loss even when the
claimant has no employment history.70 The rationale is that
65. See Struble v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch., 86 Mich. App. 245, 272 N.W.2d
617 (1978); Gambino, 86 N.J. at 105-07, 429 A.2d at 1041-43; State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Brooks, 78 A.D.2d 456, 459, 435 N.Y.S.2d 419, 421-22 (4th Dep't 1979).
66. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 294-2(7)(C) (1976); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3103(b) (1981);
Pa. Law, repealed 1984, supra note 58.
67. See generally Hudson v. Uwekoolani, 65 Hawaii 468, 653 P.2d 783 (1982). The
estate of an 11 year old boy was entitled to work loss benefits based on his lost "antici-
pated future earnings" due to impairment to his earning capacity. Id. See also Mar-
ryshow v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 306 Pa. Super. 233, 452 A.2d 530 (1982) (claimant
without a work history was not denied work loss). Cf. Struble v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins.
Exch., 86 Mich. App. 245, 272 N.W.2d 617 (1978).
68. See Marryshow v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 306 Pa. Super. 233, 452 A.2d 530
(1982); Struble v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch., 86 Mich. App. 245, 272 N.W.2d 617
(1978). The most expansive probable income definitions are provided by the pre-October
1, 1984 Pennsylvania statute. That statute includes probable income formulas for claim-
ants who are regularly employed, seasonably employed, and not employed. Pa. Law, re-
pealed 1984, supra note 58. The Pennsylvania no-fault law has been amended so that the
Pennsylvania work loss definition will be much narrower. See 75 PA. CoNs. STAT. §
1712(2) (1984).
69. See Minier v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 309 Pa. Super. 53, 454 A.2d 1078
(1982) (although the victim had retired, the court granted work loss benefits); Dorsey v.
Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 285 Pa. Super. 124, 126-27, 426 A.2d 1173, 1174 (1981) (al-
lowing unemployed claimant to recover work loss by averaging income earned in three
prior nonconsecutive years in which he was last employed).
70. Marryshow, 306 Pa. Super at 237, 452 A.2d at 532 (girl who had never entered
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss1/4
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even claimants without a work history might expect employment
affording some minimum level of income.7' In contrast, courts in
states that adhere to the actual loss theory will deny the claims
of unemployed victims, reasoning that these victims "would
have" earned nothing had they not been injured.72
2. Actual Loss States
There are basically two groups of actual loss statutes. Each
type of statute produces a similar result - the work loss claims
of the unemployed are generally denied. The reasoning relied
upon to deny recovery, however, is somewhat different depend-
ing on the type of actual loss statute that is being construed.
Laws within the first category of work loss statutes premise
recovery on what a claimant "would have" earned. Thus, since
such unemployed claimants would have earned nothing had they
not been injured, there is no basis from which to ascertain work
loss benefits.7" In these states, courts have indicated that the ba-
sis for computing work loss benefits has been deliberately re-
stricted to those losses that can be readily determined in order
to expedite and simplify no-fault litigation. By limiting work
loss to income that actually would have been earned, awards
may be determined easily with a minimum of judicial
intermediation.7'
work force was granted work loss benefits).
71. Id.
72. See MacDonald v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 350 N.W.2d 233, 236 (Mich. 1984).
See also Brooks, 78 A.D.2d at 459, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 421-22 (The court refused to permit a
work loss recovery where it was proven that the claimant would have been unemployed
had he not been injured.).
73. See Hughes v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 98 Misc. 2d 667, 671, 414 N.Y.S.2d 493,
496 (Sup.Ct. Livingston County 1979). In Hughes, the claimant was denied work loss
because she was unable to establish an actual loss of earnings. Although the victim regu-
larly worked on her husband's farm she did not draw a salary, and there was no apparent
direct loss of profits attributable to her inability to work. Consequently, although she
may have worked regularly, she would have earned nothing had she not been injured. Id.
See also MacDonald, 350 N.W.2d at 235-36 (The court stated that actual loss did not
include loss of earning capacity. Calculating work loss benefits should not become so
complex that prompt relief could not be granted).
74. See Struble, 86 Mich. App. at 245, 272 N.W.2d at 621-23; Brooks, 78 A.D.2d at
459, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 421-22. An unemployed claimant often can prove only that the
accident caused an injury which resulted in reduced earning capacity and thus the only
way to determine a basis for computing work loss would be by predicting what the victim
might have or could have earned. Brooks, 78 A.D. at 459, 435 N.Y.S. 2d at 422; cf Hud-
19841
11
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:111
The second category of actual loss statutes limits work loss
to claimants who were "income producers" at the time of their
injury.75 Here, the emphasis is not on whether an unemployed
claimant can establish a reasonable basis for ascertaining work
loss, but rather on whether he would have been an income pro-
ducer during his period of disability.
The contrasting methods used for defining actual loss affect
determination of which claimants will be entitled to work loss
benefits. An individual who is temporarily unemployed and
seeks work loss from a state in the first group may not be able to
establish any basis for what he would have earned," whereas a
claimant seeking benefits from a state in the second group may
find it easier to establish that he is an income producer although
temporarily unemployed. 8 Under either approach, however, a
firm commitment of future employment will probably be suffi-
cient to establish a work loss claim.79
son, 653 P.2d at 786-87. Consequently, litigation for work loss benefits could become
more subjective and complex, which ultimately could recreate many of the evils sought
to be avoided by a no-fault system in the first place. See Struble, 86 Mich. App. at 245,
272 N.W.2d at 621-23; see also Gambino, 86 N.J. at 105-07, 429 A.2d at 1041-42 (reduc-
ing judicial intermediation was a central purpose of the New Jersey no-fault insurance
scheme).
75. The New Jersey Supreme Court in Gambino, 86 N.J. at 109-10, 429 A.2d at
1043-44, defined "income producer" as one whose normal and prevailing way of life in-
cludes being gainfully employed in work that generates income. Moreover, as long as one
is meaningfully and concretely engaged in, or committed to, an occupational way of life,
he will be deemed to be entitled to work loss benefits. In Gambino, the claimant Joseph
Gambino had owned and operated a taxi company for 16 years. After receiving his insur-
ance broker's license, Gambino sold his taxi business in November 1975 and arranged to
begin employment as an insurance broker on January 15, 1976 at a salary of $1000 a
month. On January 13, 1976, Gambino was seriously injured and was unable to resume
work for five months. Id. at 103, 429 A.2d at 1040. The court held that Gambino was
entitled to work loss benefits. The court stated that while work loss does not cover vic-
tims whose unemployment is unrelated to their disability, it was intended to be applied
equitably. Thus, a claimant who is injured while in a brief interim between jobs will not
lose his "occupational status" and will still be considered an income producer. Id. at 109-
12, 429 A.2d at 1044-45.
76. See id. at 109-10, 429 A.2d 1043-44.
77. MacDonald, 350 N.W.2d at 236. See also MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 500.3107a.4
(1983). The Michigan law specifically provides for work loss for the temporarily unem-
ployed by expressly creating a basis for calculating work loss benefits.
78. See supra note 75.
79. See id. See also 4 N.Y. No-FAULT ARB. REP., NF-670 (1980); Slocum v. United
Pacific Ins. Co., 615 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (A firm commitment of future
employment may be a sufficient basis for granting work loss benefits); American Inter-
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss1/4
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3. Anticipated Loss States
In contrast to the actual loss states, the work loss laws of
the anticipated loss states generally do not require that a victim
prove either that he is an income producer 0 or that there is a
readily ascertainable basis for computing the loss.8
Only a few states provide statutory work loss provisions
which espouse the anticipated loss theory.82 Although these stat-
utes provide most claimants with an opportunity to receive work
loss benefits, there is an apparent legislative abhorrence toward
this liberal approach as evidenced by the drastic revision of the
Pennsylvania law.83
Until the February 12, 1984 amendment to the Pennsylva-
nia no-fault law,8 4 effective October 1, 1984,85 Pennsylvania had
perhaps the most liberal of the work loss laws.86 For instance, in
state Ins. Co. v. Revis, 156 Ga. App. 204, 274 S.E.2d 586 (1980) (The court, while recog-
nizing that employment was a prerequisite to recovery, allowed a claimant to recover
based on a firm contract of employment that would have covered the disability period.).
80. See supra note 75.
81. See Minier 309 Pa. Super. at 59, 454 A.2d at 1080 (indicating that even though
it was not clear that retiree would have ever returned to gainful employment, this was no
basis to deny work loss); see also Mattia v. Employers Mut. Co., 294 Pa. Super. 577, 583,
440 A.2d 616, 619 (1982) (permitting a victim who had recently opened a flower shop to
receive work loss benefits even though her business lost money).
82. See HAwAI REv. STAT. § 294-2(7)(C) (1976); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3103(1)
(1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.736(1)(b) (West Supp. 1984).
83. Pa. Law, repealed 1984, supra note 58.
84. Law of Feb. 12, 1984, No. 1984-11, § 1712(2), 1984 Pa. Legis. Serv. 51 (Purdon).
85. Law of Feb. 12, 1984, No. 1984-12, § 12(g), 1984 Pa. Legis. Serv. 130 (Purdon).
86. Pa. Law, repealed 1984, supra note 58. The pre-October 1, 1984 version pro-
vided comprehensive work loss definitions. It reads in pertinent part as follows:
(a) Regularly employed. - The work loss of a victim whose income prior to
the injury was realized in regular increments shall be calculated by:
(1) determining his probable weekly income by dividing his probable
annual income by fifty-two; and
(2) multiplying that quantity by the number of work weeks, or fraction
thereof, the victim sustains loss of income during the accrual period.
(b) Seasonably employed. - The work loss of a victim whose income is real-
ized in irregular increments shall be calculated by:
(1) determining his probable weekly income by dividing his probable
annual income by the number of weeks he normally works; and
(2) multiplying that quantity by the number of work weeks, or fraction
thereof, the victim was unable to perform and would have performed work
during accrual period but for the injury.
(c) Not employed. - The work loss of a victim who is not employed when
the accident resulting in injury occurs shall be calculated by-
1984]
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Marryshow v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,8 7 the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania held that the absence of employment his-
tory is not a per se basis for precluding the right to work loss
compensation."8 Relying on the pre-October 1, 1984 work loss
provision, 9 the court indicated that the injury in question af-
fected the claimant's expectations to realize income and that, in
the absence of a basis for calculating work loss benefits, the
court would establish one. Thus a full-time college student who
had no history of gainful employment, and who was not seeking
employment when she was injured, could recover work loss
benefits.90
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Hawaii noted that, in the
absence of proof of a work history, work loss would be paid if
the victim suffered impairment of his earning capacity.9" In so
holding, the court stated that benefits would be computed on
the basis of lost future anticipated earnings.9 2 This case indi-
(1) determining his probable weekly income by dividing his probable
annual income by fifty-two; and
(2) multiplying that quantity by the number of work weeks, or fraction
thereof, if any, the victim would reasonably have been expected to realize
income during the accrual period.
Id.
The post-October 1, 1984 work loss definition includes limited statutory guidance,
providing that:
(2) Income loss benefit. - Includes the following:
(i) Eighty percent of actual loss of gross income.
(ii) Reasonable expenses actually incurred for hiring a substitute to perform
self-employment services thereby mitigating loss of gross income or for hiring spe-
cial help thereby enabling a person to work and mitigate loss of gross income.
Income loss does not include loss of expected income for any period following the
death of an individual or expenses incurred for services performed following the
death of an individual. Income loss shall not commence until five working days
have been lost after the date of the accident.
Law of Feb. 12, 1984, No. 1984-11, § 1712, 1984 Pa. Legis. Serv. 50 (Purdon).
87. 306 Pa. Super. 233, 452 A.2d 530 (1982).
88. Id. at 237-38, 452 A.2d at 532. In Marryshow, the victim was a full-time first
year college student. She had no history of gainful employment. Fifteen months after the
accident, she decided not to go back to school and unsuccessfully sought work. Nation-
wide, the victim's insurer, maintained that because the victim had no history of employ-
ment, she had not suffered any income loss. The court stated that lack of an employment
history alone was not a basis for precluding the right to work loss benefits. Id.
89. Pa. Law, repealed 1984, supra note 58.
90. See Marryshow, 306 Pa. Super. at 235-36, 452 A.2d at 530-32.




cates that it is quite likely that an unemployed victim in an an-
ticipated loss state will recover work loss based on a loss of ex-
pected income, rather than on a loss of actual income.93 At least
in the case of Pennsylvania, this approach was part of the plan
that had proved to be an inefficient means to promote insurance
reform. 4
4. The New York Approach
The New York law falls within the actual loss category.95
The drafters included the language "would have earned" as op-
posed to "could" or "might" have earned. This connotes an in-
tent to limit recovery to the loss actually realized."
In New York State, an unemployed claimant will generally
find it difficult to collect work loss benefits. Although in some
cases a claimant may receive work loss benefits in excess of his
earnings level on the date of his accident, 97 recoveries are predi-
cated on a showing of "demonstrated future earnings reasonably
projected."" Several cases, however, have emphasized the need
to avoid windfall recoveries." Recent New York arbitration deci-
sions indicate that a New York claimant must show at least that
he had a firm commitment of future employment to be assured
93. See Marryshow, 306 Pa. Super. at 237-38, 452 A.2d at 532; see also Hudson, 653
P.2d at 786; cf. Morgan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 5 Kan. App. 135, 140-41, 613
P.2d 684, 689 (1980). In Morgan, the victim did not recover work loss; the court held
that a claimant needs something more than a mere hope or wish that employment is
forthcoming. Id.
94. See Gressen, No-Fault Law Failed to Boost Efficiency, Pa. L.J., Sept. 28, 1984,
at 3, col. 4.
95. See supra notes 73-74.
96. Brooks, 78 A.D.2d at 459, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
97. N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11 § 65.15(n)(2)(ii) (1983). See 4 N.Y. No-FAULT ARB.
REP., NF-624 (1980) (claimant injured after accepting job but prior to commencing em-
ployment, allowed work loss benefits based on 40 regular and 10 overtime hours per
week); see also 4 N.Y. No-FAULT ARB. REP., NF-691 (1980) (Even though claimant's in-
come actually increased during his disability, arbitrator allowed him to collect work loss
benefits because claimant's disability caused him to cut back his hours.). Cf. 8 N.Y. No-
FAULT ARB. REP., NF-1240 (1984) (Claimant may not recover work loss based on specula-
tive increases in salary.).
98. N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11 § 65.15(n)(2)(ii) (1982).
99. See Brooks, 78 A.D.2d at 459, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 422; see also Kurcsics v.
Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 451, 403 N.E.2d 159, 426 N.Y.S.2d 454 (1980) (dis-
cussing adjustment of benefits to avoid windfall resulting from tax free status of work
loss benefits).
15
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of recovery. 100
5. Analysis
Although the majority of no-fault states, including New
York, have statutes that restrict the availability of work loss
benefits to unemployed claimants, 10 1 one must question the fair-
ness of laws that cut off this source of reimbursement to poten-
tially worthy claimants. 10 2 It is clear that the goal of cost effi-
ciency cannot be attained if all claims, regardless of how
speculative, are compensated through no-fault work loss provi-
sions.103 It is not so apparent, however, that an absolute bar to
recovery is the only alternative.
A more equitable scheme might combine aspects of Penn-
sylvania's pre-October 1, 1984 scheme 04 with the more conserva-
tive work loss schemes of other states. 0 5 The pre-October 1,
1984 Pennsylvania law provides express guidance regarding the
formulae to calculate a claimant's loss of probable income.'
100. See 4 N.Y. NO-FAULT AsB. REP., NF-670 (1980). The arbitrator allowed work
loss benefits for a victim whose job was to commence three days after the accident. Id.
Cf. N.Y. No-FAULT AlB. REP. NF-636 (1980). The arbitrator denied the claim of the
victim who had an offer of a taxi-driving job but who had no hack license and had just
recently lost his driver's license. Id. See also 5 N.Y. No-FAULT Aim. REP., NF-806 (1981)
aff'd by master arbitrator. A construction worker who merely sought work estimates was
denied recovery because his claim was too speculative. Id. See also Slocum v. United
Pac. Ins. Co., 615 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (A person should not be denied work
loss benefits when he has accepted a firm offer of employment at a definite time for a
definite salary); American Inter. Ins. Co. of Ga. v. Revis, 156 Ga. App. 204, 274 S.E.2d
586 (Work loss benefits will not be granted unless the claimant proves that he had at
least a firm commitment of future employment.). Without a specific commitment, per-
haps the only recovery an unemployed New York claimant should expect is an amount
equal to any unemployment benefits he otherwise would have received had his injury not
rendered him ineligible. N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11 § 65.15(n)(2)(iv) (1982).
101. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
102. One court questioned the constitutionality of such a provision in which no-fault
coverage was required insurance. See Rybeck v. Rybeck, 141 N.J. Super. 481, 499-500,
358 A.2d 828, 838 (1976), appeal dismissed, 150 N.J. Super. 151, 375 A.2d 269 (1977).
103. See Gambino, 86 N.J. at 105-07, 429 A.2d at 1041-42.
104. Pa. Law, repealed 1984, supra note 58.
105. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
106. The pre-October 1, 1984 law provided:
"Probable annual income" means, absent a showing that it is or would be
some other amount, the following:
(A) twelve times the monthly gross income earned by the victim from work in
the month preceding the month in which the accident resulting in injury occurs,
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss1/4
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Consequently, less judicial intermediation and speculation will
be necessary to compute work loss. Furthermore, if an insurer
knows the benefits which are likely to be paid out ahead of time,
the need to increase premiums dramatically to cover unexpected
losses will be reduced.10 7 Thus, although insurers will inevitably
have to pay out more if a greater number of claimants are per-
mitted to collect work loss benefits, it is also true that if such
pay outs are predictable and actuarially quantifiable, insurance
premiums should not rise significantly.10 8
Additionally, in order to reduce the potential for windfall
recoveries, a work loss statute may provide a cutoff date for pay-
ment of work loss benefits.10 9 For instance, a law might exclude
all victims who have been unemployed for more than one year
without good reason. 10 Thus, claimants who cannot provide an
adequate reason for their unemployment will presumably suffer
no work loss that is attributable to the disability caused by an
automobile accident.
If the New York work loss law were amended to encompass
the guidelines as well as the limitations noted above, it might
better serve the no-fault goals of maximizing coverage and mini-
or the average annual income earned by the victim from work during the years,
not to exceed three, preceding the year in which the accident resulting in injury
occurs, whichever is greater, for a victim regularly employed at the time of the
accident;
(B) the average annual gross income earned by the victim from work during
the years in which he was employed, not to exceed three, preceding the year in
which the accident resulting in injury occurs, for a victim seasonally employed or
not employed at the time of the accident; or
(C) the average annual gross income of a production or non-supervisory
worker in the private nonfarm economy in the state in which the victim is domi-
ciled for the year in which the accident resulting in injury occurs, for a victim who
has not previously earned income from work.
Pa. Law, repealed 1984, supra note 58.
107. See Keeton & O'Connell, After the Accident - Traffic Victims and Insurance
Reform in PROTEcTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VicTiM: THE KEETON-O'CONNELL PLAN AND ITS
CRmcS 101-12 (1967) [hereinafter cited as KEXToN-O'CoNNLL PLAN].
108. See id. (which discusses the underwriting advantages of predictable claims, one
of which is the insurer's reduced need to increase premiums to provide for unexpected
contingencies).
109. Cf. MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 500.3107a (1983). The Michigan law provides
work loss benefits to victims who are temporarily unemployed but it does not indicate at
what point a claimant's status as temporarily unemployed ceases. Id.
110. Reasons might include: actively seeking employment, prior disability, or ac-




mizing costs. Broader statutory guidance is necessary to elimi-
nate speculation, reduce the insurer's risk, and lower insurance
premiums. The legislature, however, should be very careful to
avoid unnecessary limitations to recovery, because in light of the
harsh consequences involved in denying New York no-fault
claimants a recovery, these claimants might incur significant
hardship.
B. The Self-Employed Claimant
The self-employed claimant presents special problems to
courts seeking to compute work loss. Although a self-employed
worker is not paid on a salaried basis as is an employee, a self-
employed person often draws money from his business on a reg-
ular basis. Because a self-employed person's drawings are quite
similar to wages or salary, it would be unfair to deny work loss
benefits based on lost drawings.111 In many cases, however, it is
hard to determine what a victim's drawings would have been,
because a self-employed person often may draw income in accor-
dance with business cycles or personal needs. In such a case, his
drawings are not readily ascertainable. 1 " Furthermore, the prob-
lem becomes more complex when self-employed claimants elect
not to draw salaries but instead seek work loss benefits based on
lost profits.113
1. Jurisdictional Overview - Lost Drawings
A self-employed person's lost drawings are often regarded as
compensable work loss.11 One reason for this treatment is that
many work loss statutes use the phrase "lost income" or "lost
earnings." Some courts have reasoned that this language indi-
111. See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Neighbors, 421 A.2d 888 (Del. 1980).
See also Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Graham, 451 A.2d 832 (Del. 1982).
112. Graham, 451 A.2d at 835. The claimant, who was a self-employed paper dis-
tributor, was denied work loss benefits because drawings fluctuated so drastically that
the court could not ascertain a basis upon which to make a work loss award. Id.
113. See Young v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 107 Misc. 2d 417, 435 N.Y.S.2d 220 (Sup. Ct.
Allegany County 1980), modified, 86 A.D.2d 764, 448 N.Y.S.2d 83 (4th Dep't 1982).
114. See Neighbors, 421 A.2d at 889; see also Graham, 451 A.2d at 835; Mattia v.
Employers Mut. Co., 284 Pa. Super. 577, 582-84, 440 A.2d 616, 618-19 (1981); HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 294-2(7)(b) (1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90 § 34A (West Supp. 1984-




cates that work loss benefits should'not be confined to employ-
ees but should be extended to the self-employed. 115 A self-em-
ployed worker who is disabled by an automobile accident and, as
a result, is deprived of the salary he regularly draws from his
business, is no different from an employee who loses his regular
paycheck. 116
Few states provide statutory guidance for lost self-employ-
ment income. Although the laws of Hawaii1 7 and Kansas118 at-
tempt to provide formulae for this calculation, they offer little
guidance. These laws merely instruct courts to award benefits
monthly in an amount equal to the claimant's average annual
earnings divided by twelve." ' This statutory guidance is of little
value other than perhaps to direct the court to award equal
monthly benefits as opposed to benefits that reflect sporadic an-
nual drawings.13 0
The Delaware Supreme Court in United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. v. Neighbors1 has provided perhaps the most in-
structive guidelines for determining work loss based on lost
drawings. In Neighbors, the victim was the sole proprietor of a
gasoline station who drew income periodically.1 22 The court, in
holding that the victim was entitled to work loss benefits, indi-
cated that drawings were recoverable only to the extent that
115. See Neighbors, 421 A.2d at 889. See also Graham, 451 A.2d at 835. Although
some drafters of no-fault laws apparently believed there was a need expressly to include
lost self-employment income within the definition of work loss, express language would
seem to be unnecessary, unless a statute expressly defined work loss as lost wages from
employment. See Neighbors, 421 A.2d at 889.
116. Neighbors, 421 A.2d at 889. Such a loss would probably qualify as income that
"would have" been earned. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text. Similarly, self-
employed persons would likely qualify as "income producers." See supra notes 75-76 and
accompanying text.
117. See HAwAiI REv. STAT. § 294-2(7)(B) (1976).
118. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3103(l)(1) (1981).
119. See HAwAII REv. STAT. § 294-2(7)(B) (1976); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3103(l)(1)
(1981).
120. See, e.g., KA. STAT. ANN. § 40-3103(l) (1981). The only guidance provided by
the Kansas statute is as follows: "'Monthly earnings' means: (1) In the case of a regu-
larly employed person or a person regularly self-employed, one-twelfth (1/12) of the an-
nual earnings at the time of injury . Id.
121. 421 A.2d 888 (Del. 1980).




they were: (1) drawn on a consistent basis,12 (2) predictable, 2 "
and (3) easily calculable without substantial dispute. 2 5 The
court noted that these three factors could be used to establish a
"base minimum draw" which, in turn, could be relied on to de-
termine work loss benefits. 12 6 In essence, the Neighbors guide-
lines permit recovery of lost drawings that are akin to salary and
may be computed readily without speculation or broad judicial
discretioh.
2. Jurisdictional Analysis - Lost Business Profits
Although work loss claims based on lost drawings are gener-
ally accepted, there is some disagreement regarding whether lost
business profits are work loss at all. 12 7 Lost profits might be re-
garded as a lost investment rather than lost work income. Fur-
ther, lost business profits are more speculative, because they are
often variable depending on the particular accounting practice
employed. 2 8
The problems involved in determining the amount of lost
profits have prompted at least one court to advocate a wholesale
rejection of work loss claims based on lost business profits. 2 9 On
the other hand, the Kansas Court of Appeals in Bradley v. Aid
Insurance Co.,130 observed that when lost profits are dependent
on personal labor as opposed to capital investment, they are
properly considered as lost earnings.' The Bradley court,
guided by the reasoning of the New Jersey Superior Court in
Zyck v. Hartford Insurance Group,3 2 noted that when overhead
123. Id. at 889-90.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 890.
126. Id. Cf. Graham, 451 A.2d at 835 (Where income fluctuates widely throughout
the year making a base level of earnings unascertainable, the victim will not collect work
loss benefits.).
127. Neighbors, 421 A.2d at 889-90. Cf. Hughes, 98 Misc. 2d at 672, 414 N.Y.S.2d at
497 (Woman who did not draw a regular salary had no right to work loss benefits.).
128. See Young v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 107 Misc. 2d 417, 220 N.Y.S.2d 220 (Sup. Ct.
Allegany County 1980). See also Bradley v. Aid Ins. Co., 6 Kan. App. 2d 367, 375-77, 629
P.2d 720, 727-28 (1981).
129. See Neighbors, 421 A.2d at 889-90.
130. 6 Kan. App. 2d 367, 629 P.2d 720 (1981).
131. Id. at 373-74, 629 P.2d at 725-26.
132. 143 N.J. Super. 580, 364 A.2d 32 (1976), modified, 150 N.J. Super. 431, 375




is low and income is generated by personal endeavors of the in-
sured (as in the case of a real estate salesman) lost profits were
properly equated with lost earnings.13 3 Moreover, the Bradley
court indicated that if this low overhead, high personal labor
test was used, compensating these work loss claims would be in
accordance with "the guiding principle of efficiency implicit in a
workable no-fault scheme.""
Although it did not explicitly define which lost profits are
compensable as work loss, the Bradley court implied that taxa-
ble income may be an inappropriate guide for computing work
loss benefits. 3 5 The court noted that tax accounting practices
are designed to minimize income in order to reduce tax liability,
and that a victim might be able to demonstrate lost profits by
relying on some less conservative but acceptable accounting
practice.3 6 The Bradley decision did not indicate which ac-
counting principles could be relied on in place of the tax ac-
counting principles. Presumably, depreciation, as well as other
tax benefits, tends to overshadow the value of a claimant's per-
sonal contributions to the income generation of the business.
Therefore, a court must use its discretion in valuing the claim-
ant's personal contribution to the income of the enterprise.
3. The New York Approach - Drawings
The New York statute does not address the issue of lost
self-employment income other than to provide for paying the
"reasonable and necessary expenses incurred by . . . [victims]
. . . in obtaining services in lieu of those that would have been
performed for income.' ' 3 7 The statute does not address the eco-
nomic loss incurred by a claimant who does not pay someone
else to perform his work, but who has in fact lost income be-
cause of his disability. In Hughes v. Nationwide Mutual Insur-
ance Co." 3 8 a New York court indicated that it may be unfair to
133. Bradley, 6 Kan. App. at 374, 629 P.2d at 726.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 376-77, 629 P.2d at 727.
136. See id. The Bradley court indicated that determinations based on business
profits would be done on a case by case method. Thus, the court would have discretion
given a set of particular facts. Id.
137. N.Y. INS. LAW § 671(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).




treat self-employed claimants differently from salaried claim-
ants, when both suffer a similar economic loss. 139 Although
Hughes dealt with lost business profits as work loss, the same
argument can be made when the claimant seeks work loss based
on lost drawings.
There is no statutory guidance for computing work loss
based on lost drawings; however, the Commissioner of New York
State's Insurance Department has provided some guidance. The
general rule provided by the Commissioner is that work loss only
compensates for "demonstrated future earnings reasonably pro-
jected."1 40 Therefore, a self-employed claimant is likely to collect
work loss based on lost drawings as long as drawings are reason-
ably ascertainable.
4. The New York Approach - Lost Business Profits
In Young v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co.,14 ' the New York
Supreme Court applied the reasonably ascertainable criteria to
cases involving lost business profits.14 2 The Young decision illus-
trates how difficult it can be to define reasonable business prof-
its. In Young, a self-employed building contractor, who had re-
ported tax losses in each of the two preceding years, sought work
loss benefits. 4 3 The insurer refused Young's claims on the the-
ory that he had not lost either salary or profits and had not in-
curred any expense in bringing in someone to perform his
work.14 4
The Young court rejected the insurer's arguments and con-
cluded that a tax loss did not necessarily indicate that the vic-
tim did not have ascertainable "lost earnings" within the mean-
ing of New York's work loss law." The court observed that
Young had been able to support his family on the earnings from
his business during the past two years, even though the business
had sustained a tax loss; thus, it would be unfair to deny Young
139. See id. at 672, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 497.
140. N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11 § 65.15(n)(2)(ii) (1982).
141. 107 Misc. 2d 417, 435 N.Y.S.2d 220 (Sup. Ct. Allegany County 1980), modified,
86 A.D.2d 764, 448 N.Y.S.2d 83 (4th Dep't 1982).
142. See id. at 423, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 224.
143. Id. at 418, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 220.
144. Id.




work loss benefits. 1 6 The Young court concluded that actual
self-employment income was not equal to taxable income." '7
Rather, actual self-employment earnings could be calculated by
subtracting from gross business revenues the "mandated items
of expense incident to the operation of the business.1' 48 In es-
sence, the court sought to isolate expenses that were essential to
the generation of income for a specific year.149 The court con-
cluded that certain expenses, for example depreciation, were
theoretical non-cash expenses and, as such, are not actual ex-
penses of the business. s° In addition, expenses incurred as a
matter of personal choice, such as interest on long-term indebt-
edness, were not mandated in the operation of a current year's
business. 151 These expenses were either deductions taken solely
for tax purposes or expenses incurred to perpetuate future busi-
ness. Thus, such expenses were in fact earnings reinvested.'
Consequently, the Young court found that, despite the claim-
ant's tax loss, work loss benefits could be paid in an amount
equal to the total of the expenses that were not "mandated.' 5 3
146. Id. at 420, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 222.
147. Id. at 423, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 223-24.
148. Id. "Mandated items of expense" include expenses actually incurred and abso-
lutely necessary to generate income within a specific year. Id.
149. Id. at 422, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 223.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. The court reasoned that these expenses were incurred, as a matter of per-
sonal choice, to prolong the life of the claimant's business, and were not "mandated" to
operate the business within a specific year. Id. See also 6 N.Y. No-FAULT ARB. REP., NF-
976 (1982) (A self-employed messenger was permitted to recover work loss benefits based
on business expenses that had been incurred but that could not have been terminated in
order to avoid loss.).








Id. On appeal, the court modified the lower court award to reflect the 20% statutory
offset, in order to account for nontaxability of work loss benefits. Young v. Utica Mut.
Ins. Co., 86 A.D.2d 764, 448 N.Y.S.2d 83 (4th Dep't 1982), modifying 107 Misc.2d 417,





Although the result in Young is equitable, it does not pro-
vide a predictable and efficient method for compensating self-
employed victims. Aside from the obvious potential for inconsis-
tent application of the Young court's "mandated expense" anal-
ysis, 15 4 there is no guarantee that this complex computation will
consistently lead to recoveries that substantially compensate a
victim for his economic loss. Rather, it is likely that the work
loss benefits will be based on some arbitrary number, which no
more reflects "actual" earnings than any other amount.155
To provide for business losses in a way that is consistent
with the no-fault goals of efficiency and fairness, New York's
work loss law must be amended to provide a predictable method
of calculation. The legislature should provide an express statu-
tory scheme for calculating work loss based on business profits.
The provision should define actual loss in a way that could be
applied quickly and consistently. The legislature could improve
upon the Young rule by indicating which expenses are to be re-
garded as mandated expense items.1s' This approach would fa-
cilitate the calculation of profits, reduce arbitrariness, and in-
crease predictability in attempts to determine "demonstrated
future earnings reasonably projected.' ' 57
154. When the lower court adjusts for depreciation, it is impliedly advocating a cash
basis accounting system. Alternatively, when it adjusts taxable income by the amount in
prepaid expenses, the court is impliedly using an accrual accounting system. See Young,
107 Misc. 2d at 421, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 223.
155. See, e.g., 4 N.Y. No-FAULT Aim. REP., NF-696 (1980). The arbitrator concluded
that gross business income was too great an amount to use as a basis for calculating work
loss. Additionally, the arbitrator concluded that net income was too small an amount on
which to rely. Instead the arbitrator raised net income by multiplying the expenses de-
ducted from gross income by an undisclosed factor. Id.
156. Because the Young court defined actual loss in terms of matching income and
expenses, the accrual method of accounting would be preferable. The accrual method of
accounting is predicated on the matching of income and expenses during a specific time
period. D. Kmso & J. WEYGANTr, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 34-35 (3d ed. 1980). Further-
more, since the New York scheme already expressly provides compensation to victims
who incur expenses in obtaining services in lieu of those the victim would have per-
formed for income, N.Y. INs. LAW § 671(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984), it should
similarly provide for compensation to victims who sustain economic loss even though
they chose not to pay another to do their work.




C. The Seasonally Employed Claimant
The seasonally employed claimant has presented unique
problems to no-fault lawmakers. Depending on the victim's par-
ticular employment arrangement, a court might find a seasonal
employee to be temporarily unemployed, and for that reason not
entitled to work loss benefits.1" A further problem is the poten-
tial for a windfall when a seasonal employee collects benefits for
a period in which he is ordinarily unemployed. 15 9
1. Jurisdictional Overview
Although at least two state laws expressly provide for the
payment of work loss benefits to seasonally employed victims, 60
it is possible that seasonally employed claimants will recover
work loss in states where statutes do not so provide, even if they
are unemployed at the time of the accident."' Clearly, seasonal
employment could be regarded as a firm commitment of future
employment.1 62 Moreover, it is apparent that if the disability
persists through a period of seasonal employment, the victim
"would have" had earnings but for the accident.'
Most work loss laws do not indicate how to calculate losses
for the seasonally employed victim. The Kentucky law'" pro-
vides some guidance, stating that earnings shall be equitably ad-
justed on an annual basis.16 5 This approach, however, creates a
potential for a windfall recovery by a claimant. 66 If a victim
158. See MacDonald, 350 N.W.2d at 235-36.
159. See Armacost v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 231 Kan. 276, 280-81, 644 P.2d
403, 406-07 (1982) (McFarland, J., dissenting) (discussing potential for windfall when
victim's benefits are not adjusted to account for seasonal unemployment).
160. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304.39-130 (Bobbs-Merrill 1981); Pa. Law, repealed 1984,
supra note 58 (which provided for seasonally employed claimants). See also MICH. CoMP.
LAWS ANN. § 500.3107a (1983) (temporarily unemployed may collect work loss benefits);
HAWAII REv. STAT. § 294-2(7)(C) (1976) (claimant not regularly employed may collect
work loss benefits).
161. Cf. MacDonald, 350 N.W.2d at 237 (The court notes that seasonal unemploy-
ment might be a basis to deny work loss benefits to a claimant).
162. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
164. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.39.130 (Bobbs-Merrill 1981).
165. Id.
166. See Armacost, 231 Kan. at 280-81, 644 P.2d at 406-07 (McFarland, J., dissent-
ing). As noted by Justice McFarland, if a claimant works 10 months a year for $12,000




works ten months of the year but is injured during the other two
months, and receives benefits during those two months based on
pro-rated annual earnings, he may realize a windfall if he is able
to return to work when his period of usual employment com-
mences. 167 The pre-October 1984 Pennsylvania statute addresses
this problem by expressly limiting work loss to compensate only
injuries that occur during a period of seasonal employment.1 68
Thus, a claimant receives his full salary when he is injured dur-
ing a period of seasonal employment and nothing presumably if
the injury persists during a period of seasonal unemployment.
2. The New York Approach
The New York State Insurance Department has adopted a
method similar to that of the superseded Pennsylvania stat-
ute.16e In New York regardless of when the injury occurs, a sea-
sonally employed claimant is eligible to collect work loss benefits
based on his full salary if his disability coincides with a period of
seasonal employment.1 70 Alternatively, the claimant will receive
nothing if his disability coincides with a period of seasonal un-
employment.1 7 1 This is the sensible method of handling these
work loss claims. Under this method, a victim cannot realize a
windfall for fortuitously sustaining injury at a favorable time of
the year, and the victim's recovery will be limited to his actual
loss.
assess damages on a full year, that is, $12,000 divided by 12 months. Thus, the victim
might be paid $14,000 instead of his normal $12,000. Id. at 280-81, 644 P.2d at 406-07; cf.
4 N.Y. No-FAULT ARB. REP., NF-623 (1980). The arbitrator adjusted the claimant's
award to account for seasonal unemployment. Id.
167. Armacost, 231 Kan. at 280-81, 644 P.2d at 406-07 (McFarland, J., dissenting).
168. Pa. Law, repealed 1984, supra note 58.
169. See N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11 § 65.15n(2)(iii) (1982). The regulation provides
that "[a]n applicant, whose unemployment was the result of the seasonal nature of the
work which the applicant usually performed, shall be entitled to receive payments for
loss of earnings from work during the claimed period of disability arising from the acci-






IV. Offsets and Deductions to Work Loss Benefit Recoveries
A. The Reason for Offsets and Deductions
No-fault work loss provisions provide insurers with the right
to reduce benefits by allowable offsets and deductions. The in-
surer is granted this right to avoid a windfall recovery.17 2 A vic-
tim receives "windfall" benefits if he obtains duplicate benefits
for the same loss, or benefits in excess of the loss incurred.17 3
Several states, including New York,1 74 have enacted provisions
that coordinate benefits to avoid waste and duplication in order
to prevent increased insurance costs.1 75
B. Taxation
Work loss benefits are often not taxable. Because earnings
are subject to taxation, the tax-free status of work loss recov-
eries represents an added benefit to the victim.17 6 Thus, the in-
surer is permitted to adjust recoveries in order to avoid windfall
recoveries. 17
1. Jurisdictional Overview
Work loss statutes fall into one of four categories with re-
spect to tax adjustment. The first category does not mention any
tax adjustments.17 8 Thus, it is up to the court to modify work
172. See W. RoKEs, No-FAULT INSURANCE 195-96 (which discusses issues relating to
no-fault benefit offsets and deductions).
173. Id. See also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brooks, 78 A.D.2d 456, 458-59,
435 N.Y.S.2d 419, 421-22 (4th Dep't 1981) (indicating that drafters of no-fault law sought
to avoid windfall recoveries, which could result in high premium burdens, by limiting
loss to actual loss incurred).
174. See N.Y. INS. LAw § 671(1)(c)-(2)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
175. See King, supra note 8 at 297-403 (discussing the offset provisions of the ex-
isting no-fault laws); see also KEETON-O'CONNELL PLAN, supra note 107 (discussing the
need for coordination of collateral insurance sources).
176. Kurcsics v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 451, 457, 403 N.E.2d 159, 162,
426 N.Y.S.2d 454, 457 (1980).
177. Id. If a victim's gross income is $100 but his net after tax income is $80, the
victim would be overcompensated for his loss, unless the insurer is allowed to reduce the
award to account for this after tax effect. Id.
178. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-319(b) (West Supp. 1983); MD. ANN. CODE §
539(a) (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-4(b) (West Supp. 1983-1984); S.C. CODE ANN. §
56-11-110 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1981); S.D. CODWIED LAWS ANN. § 58-23-8(2) (1978); TEx.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. § 5.06-3(b) (1981); VA. CODE § 38.1-380.1(b) (Supp. 1984); cf. COLO.
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loss benefits to avoid a windfall. The second category of statutes
permits only a percentage of the victim's income to be consid-
ered as the work loss amount. 179 These laws provide for amounts
between sixty and eighty-five percent of gross lost income to be
considered as work loss.180 Consequently, there is no need to re-
duce awards to account for tax benefits."8 The third category of
statutes provides for a reduction of gross loss by a specific per-
centage.18 2 Most states in group three permit the claimant to re-
but the presumed tax benefit if, in fact, the benefit is less than
the statutory percentage. Only New York regards the offset as
an irrebuttable presumption. 8 ' The fourth category includes
only Delaware. That law merely directs courts to adjust benefits
to reflect the claimant's tax savings. 8 4 The amount of the reduc-
tion permitted pursuant to this fourth method must be deter-
mined through factfinding.
2. The New York Approach
The New York plan falls within the third group, reducing
aggregate loss by twenty percent 85 to account for the non-taxa-
ble status of work loss benefits.186 The reduction is essentially a
REV. STAT. § 10-4-706(l)(d)(I) (1973) (stating that work loss is to be computed based on
100% of lost income); HAwMI REV. STAT. § 294-2(7)(A) (1976) (stating that work loss
computed is to be based on lost income before state and federal income taxes).
179. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-4014(b) (1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627-736(1)(b)
(West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-34-4(a)(2)(B) (1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-
3103(b)(2) (1981); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 34A (West Supp. 1984-1985); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 65B.44(3) (West Supp. 1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-41-03(21) (Supp.
1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 743.805(1)(b) (1981); Law of Feb. 12, 1984, No. 1984-11, § 1712,
1984 Pa. Legis. Serv. 50 (Purdon); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-41-6(1)(b)(i) (Supp. 1983) (If
benefits are not includable for the purposes of federal income tax, then 100% of lost
income will be considered in computing work loss benefits.).
180. See laws cited supra note 179.
181. Any tax saving that might have resulted is eliminated because only a fraction
of gross income is considered for work loss computations.
182. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.39-120(2) (Bobbs-Merrill 1981); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 500.3107(b) (1983); N.Y. INs. LAW § 671(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984);
Pa. Law, repealed 1984, supra note 58. Note however that the post October 1, 1984 law
is in the second category. See Law of Feb. 12, 1984, No. 1984-11, § 1712, 1984 Pa. Legis.
Serv. 50 (Purdon).
183. N.Y. INs. LAW § 671(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
184. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2118(a)(2)(a)(2) (1979).
185. N.Y. INs. LAW § 671(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).




conclusive presumption, in that the insured may not prove that
his tax benefit was, in fact, less than twenty percent. 18 7 This ad-
justment, however, represents a fair estimate of the tax that
would have been imposed on the lost earnings recouped by work
loss benefits.1'88
Although there may be some circumstances in which the
twenty percent figure is unrealistic, it is unlikely that it could
cause significant hardship. 89 Legislative action that attempts to
account precisely for the tax effect sustained by an individual
claimant may be too complex and, as such, counterproductive in
light of the statutory goal of promoting an efficient means of set-
tling claims.190
C. Workers' Compensation
Since efficient claims settlement requires purging waste and
duplication from the system, insurers have been provided with
offsets to account for duplicative insurance coverage. In most
states no-fault insurance and workers' compensation, or similar
government insurance systems, are deemed to be concurrent
laws and, as such, may potentially compensate victims twice for
the same lost income.' If a victim is permitted to collect under
both insurance systems, it is likely that the victim will receive a
windfall.
1. Jurisdictional Overview
Generally, an injured victim may collect both no-fault and
workers' compensation benefits. 92 Most work loss laws permit
N.Y.S.2d 454 (1980).
187. N.Y. INS. LAW § 671(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
188. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1(c) (West 1984) (For instance, a single taxpayer would be in
the 18% tax bracket when his income reaches the $12,000 annual work loss benefit
maximum.).
189. Real dollars lost as a result of this offset decrease as income decreases.
190. Extensive judicial intermediation for the purposes of determining the precise
tax offset would likely increase the cost of settling claims and thus increase insurance
premiums. REPORT TO GOVERNOR, supra note 1, at 106-07.
191. See Comment, New York Adopts No-Fault: A Summary and Analysis, 37 ALB.
L. REV. 662, 692-93 (1973); see also KANSAS No-FAULT, supra note 7, at 399.
192. Brown v. Boston Old Colony Ins. Co., 247 Ga. 287, 275 S.E.2d 651 (1981),
Mathis v. Interstate Motor Freight System, 408 Mich. 164, 289 N.W.2d 708 (1980),




insurers to offset workers' compensation benefits to avoid dupli-
cation of benefits.119 In so doing, the cost of no fault is kept
lower than if both the workers' compensation and no-fault insur-
ers were reimbursing the victim one dollar to cover a victim's
single dollar of loss. 194
On the other hand, some state courts have held that those
entitled to workers' compensation cannot also collect no-fault
benefits. 195 The Massachusetts Supreme Court, in Flaherty v.
Travelers Insurance Co. ,19' noted that the legislative enactment
of no fault did not signal a retreat from the long held workers'
compensation exclusivity doctrine. 9 7 Thus, the workers' com-
pensation system and no-fault system would be treated as if
they were mutually exclusive sources of benefits. 8"
Among the states that recognize a victim's right to collect
under both systems, there is a difference of opinion concerning
how offsets should be calculated. One method advocates sub-
tracting workers' compensation that is recovered or recover-
able"'99 from the victim's aggregate loss. 20 0 Under this method, a
Maiorano, 44 N.Y.2d 364, 376 N.E.2d 1311, 405 N.Y.S.2d 666 (1978).
193. COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-4-707(5) (Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-
333(c) (West Supp. 1982); D.C. CODE ANN. § 35-2110(b)(2) (Supp. 1983); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 627.736(4)(d)(3) (West Supp. 1983-1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-34-8(a) (1982); HA-
wAI REV. STAT. § 294-5(b) (Supp. 1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3110(a) (1981); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 304.39-120(1) (Bobbs-Merrill 1981); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 543(d)
(1979); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 34A (West Supp. 1984-1985); MICH. Comp. LAWS
ANN. § 500.3109(1) (1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65B.61(1) (West Supp. 1984); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 39:6A-6 (West 1975); N.Y. INS. LAW § 671(2)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-41-12(1)(b) (1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 743.810(2) (1981); Pa. Law,
repealed 1984, supra note 58; S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-11-150(D) (Law. Co-op. 1977); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 31-41-7(3) (Supp. 1983); cf. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 58-23-8(2) (1978);
TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5.06-3(c) (Vernon 1981) (The South Dakota and Texas
laws do not provide for workers' compensation offsets.).
194. See Normile v. Allstate Ins. Co., 87 A.D.2d 721, 722, 448 N.Y.S.2d 907, 908 (3d
Dep't 1982), afl'd, 60 N.Y.2d 1003, 459 N.E.2d 843, 471 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1983). If one as-
sumes that an insurance company bases its insurance rates on the amount of money the
company will have to pay its insureds in benefits (average claim cost), it is not unreason-
able to conclude that premium rates are distorted when payments of benefits compen-
sate a victim twice for one injury. See KEETON-O'CONNELL, supra note 107, at 104.
195. Flaherty v. Travelers Ins. Co., 369 Mass. 482, 340 N.E.2d 888 (1976).
196. 369 Mass. 482, 340 N.E.2d 888 (1976).
197. Id., 340 N.E.2d at 891.
198. Id.
199. In many circumstances, merely being entitled to workers' compensation bene-
fits triggers a set-off whether or not such benefits are in fact collected. See HAWAII REV.




claimant with a large enough loss may collect workers' compen-
sation benefits as well as the maximum work loss benefits.20 1 Al-
ternatively, some states calculate workers' compensation offsets
by subtracting the amount recovered or recoverable from the no-
fault policy limits. 20 2 With this procedure, once a victim collects
a combination of workers' compensation and no-fault benefits,
which totals an amount equal to the no-fault policy limits, work
loss benefits will no longer be available to the victim. 203
2. The New York Approach
The New York Court of Appeals in Normile v. Allstate In-
surance Co.2 04 recently affirmed an appellate division ruling that
adjusted work loss benefits by subtracting the amount recovered
or recoverable under workers' compensation from the no-fault
policy limits.205 The appellate division in Normile indicated that
it was the legislature's intent to limit basic economic loss to
$50,000 regardless of whether the $50,000 was actually paid by
the no-fault insurer or the workers' compensation insurer.20 6 The
court reasoned that the basic economic loss limit of $50,000
11 § 65.15(p)(6)(i) (1982). See also Cady v. Aetna Life and Cas. Co., 113 Misc. 2d 1080,
450 N.Y.S.2d 679 (Sup. Ct. Broome County), modified, 96 A.D.2d 967, 466 N.Y.S.2d 850
(3d Dep't 1983), aff'd in part, 61 N.Y.2d 594, 463 N.E.2d 1214, 475 N.Y.S.2d 362 (1984).
In Cady, the workers' compensation insurer paid the employer benefits as a reimburse-
ment for amounts disbursed by the employer to the victim who had been receiving these
benefits under an accrued sick leave plan. The appellate division concluded that these
amounts could be considered recoverable by the victim and were properly offset against
the victim's work loss benefits. Cady v. Aetna Life and Cas. Co., 96 A.D.2d at 969, 466
N.Y.S.2d at 853.
200. The calculation would be as follows: aggregate loss of income minus workers'
compensation recovered or recoverable equals loss available for no-fault reimbursement.
See Comeau v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 356 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 1978).
201. Id.
202. No-fault work loss policy limit minus workers' compensation recovered or re-
coverable equals work loss benefits available. Normile v. Allstate Ins. Co., 87 A.D.2d 721,
448 N.Y.S.2d 907, aff'd 60 N.Y.2d 1003, 459 N.E.2d 842, 471 N.Y.S.2d 550. See also
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65B.61(2)(a) (West Supp. 1984); Prax v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 322 N.W.2d 752, 753-54 (Minn. 1982).
203. Normile, 87 A.D.2d at 722, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 908. See also Prax, 322 N.W.2d at
754.
204. 60 N.Y.2d 1003, 459 N.E.2d 842, 471 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1983).
205. Normile v. Allstate Ins. Co., 60 N.Y.2d 1003, 459 N.E.2d 842, 471 N.Y.S.2d 550
(1983), aff'g, 87 A.D.2d 721, 448 N.Y.S.2d 907 (3d Dep't 1982).
206. Normile, 87 A.D.2d at 722-23, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 908.
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played an important role in distinguishing claims that are com-
pensable under the no-fault system from claims that fall outside
the no-fault system.2 7 It may be inferred from this reasoning
that the underlying purpose of no-fault insurance is to provide a
source of recovery for the first $50,000 of economic loss. Once a
victim has been compensated for the first $50,000 of his eco-
nomic loss the state has satisfied its no-fault goals, and the vic-
tim must then seek recompense for any excess losses by either
bringing a tort action or collecting from a private insurance
source.
20 8
Judge Cooke, dissenting from the New York Court of Ap-
peals' affirmation of Normile, noted that this method of offset-
ting allows insurers to avoid their primary responsibility, which
is to compensate for basic economic loss. 209 Judge Cooke ex-
plained that this method may leave innocent persons under
compensated.2 10 He reasoned that the legislature could not have
intended to penalize victims who suffered losses in excess of
$50,000 by reducing their no-fault benefits below $50,000.211
Rather, a victim should be entitled to $50,000 in no-fault protec-




209. Normile v. Allstate Ins. Co., 60 N.Y.2d at 1006, 459 N.E.2d at 844, 471
N.Y.S.2d at 550 (Cooke, J., dissenting).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1006, 459 N.E.2d at 844, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 551.
212. Id. at 1008, 459 N.E.2d at 845, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 552. Judge Cook illustrated his
theory as follows:
The basic theory of plaintiff's approach is quite simple. Recognizing that
medical expenses and loss of income, for example, may easily exceed $50,000, it
only requires that collateral-source payments are to be allocated first to the top
end, i.e., those damages exceeding $50,000. This can be illustrated by analogy. An
insured's losses are represented by a long, vertical tube that is closed at the bot-
tom. These losses are compensated by payments from the insurer - represented
by a heavy, blue liquid - and from collateral sources - represented by a
lighter, red liquid. There is only enough blue liquid to reach the $50,000 mark on
the vertical tube. Being "heavier," the insurance company's payments will always
sink to the tube's bottom below the collateral-source payments as they both are
poured in. Consequently, the insurance company's payments are always allocated
to "basic economic loss." If there were claims for $75,000 and $25,000 was paid by
collateral sources, those payments (the lighter, red liquid) would be "floating" on




Although Judge Cooke's dissent has support, 13 the major-
ity's approach is clearly preferable in light of the goals of no-
fault protection. The no-fault system was not designed to com-
pensate for all losses incurred as a result of an auto accident;
instead it was intended to compensate for substantially all
losses while keeping insurance rates low.2 14 Consequently, it
seems imprudent to risk higher insurance rates for all motorists
in an effort to provide added coverage to a few victims, when
these victims may purchase additional insurance from private
sources to protect against a catastrophic loss.
D. Employer Provided Wage Continuation Plans
An important issue, which few no-fault laws address, is ac-
counting for an employer-provided disability or wage continua-
tion plan.2 3 Often a disabled employee may be fully compen-
sated by his employer for his disability. Thus, an employee who
also collects work loss benefits may be receiving compensation
without having suffered any income loss.
1. Jurisdictional Overview
A few states, including Florida, 16 Georgia,21 7 Maryland, 2 8
and Massachusetts,21 9 expressly require work loss reductions to
avoid duplicating payments made under employer-provided
wage continuation plans. In addition, the New Jersey Superior
Court in Puzio v. New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Co. 220
held that benefits received from an employer-provided disability
plan were to be offset against work loss benefits.221 The court
reasoned that this private plan was analogous to government in-
213. See Comeau v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 356 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 1978).
214. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
215. Wage continuation plans may include an employee's sick days. See Cady v.
Aetna Life and Cas. Co., 113 Misc. 2d 1080, 450 N.Y.S.2d 679 (Sup. Ct. Broome County),
modified, 96 A.D.2d 967, 466 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d Dep't 1983), aff'd in part, 61 N.Y.2d 594,
463 N.E.2d 1214, 475 N.Y.S.2d 362 (1984). Wage continuation plans may also include
comprehensive long term disability. See infra note 228.
216. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.732(d) (West Supp. 1984).
217. GA. CODE ANN. § 33-34-8 (1982).
218. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A § 540 (1979).
219. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 34A (West Supp. 1983-1984).
220. 165 N.J. Super. 585, 398 A.2d 934 (1979).




surance, which normally would be offset against no-fault work
loss benefits.222 Specifically, this plan shared many common fea-
tures with government insurance such as compulsory participa-
tion, governmental supervision, and equalized costs for
participants.228
In Michigan, insureds are offered reduced premiums for off-
setting no-fault coverage with available private benefits.2 2" ' At
least one court has held that offsets under this plan are to be
subtracted from no-fault policy limits.225 Because the insured
was allowed a rate reduction, it was considered unfair to allow
him the maximum work loss protection at a lower rate. If an
insured wants protection in excess of the-no-fault policy limits,
the amount paid, whether to his no-fault carrier or to a private
insurer, should reflect this added protection.226
2. The New York Approach
In 1977, the New York work loss law was amended to in-
clude an offset for a qualified wage continuation plan.22 7 Al-
though both qualified and non-qualified wage continuation plans
provide employees with sickness or disability benefits when the
employee has been injured and is unable to work, future benefits
available under a qualified plan are not affected by current
use. 2 8 The amendment ensures that an employee will not suffer
222. Id.
223. See id.
224. MICH. Comp. LAWs ANN. § 500.3109a (1983).
225. Zmudczynski v. League Gen. Ins. Co., 99 Mich. App. 442, 297 N.W.2d 696
(1980).
226. Id. at 445, 297 N.W.2d at 698. Thus, an insured cannot gain additional first
party benefits by merely paying the same amount of money to two different insurers.
Rather he must pay more to get more coverage. Id. See also Prax, 322 N.W.2d at 755
(discussing the effects of equalized costs and work loss benefit offsets and deductions as
they relate to workers' compensation insurance).
227. Act of Aug. 11, 1977, ch. 892, 1977 N.Y. Laws 1824, 1831-32 (codified as
amended at N.Y. Ins. Law § 5221 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984)).
228. In an effort to clarify the no-fault law, the New York State Department of
Insurance has issued a series of Circular Letters explaining how various wage continua-
tion plans will be regarded. The following excerpt comes from one of these circular
letters:
Section 671(1) of the Insurance Law contains a provision that requires insur-
ers to reduce gross loss of earnings from work by benefits paid under what have
become known as "qualified wage continuation plans" when calculating no-fault




an offset if his wage continuation benefits deplete with use. For
example, under a non-qualified plan, if an employee is given
only ten sick days per year,229 each time he uses a sick day, one
of his accrued benefits available for future injuries will be lost.
Thus, if the employee collects benefits from his non-qualified
wage continuation plan, he may also seek work loss benefits
without fear of sustaining an offset. Alternatively, a worker will
sustain a reduction in work loss benefits if he is covered by a
qualified plan that will not deplete, that remains at its maxi-
mum benefit level for future disability or illness.2 30
A worker covered by a qualified plan may receive a no-fault
In order for a particular wage continuation plan to qualify under the afore-
mentioned provision it must meet all of the following three conditions:
1) The applicant must be entitled to receive the same level of wage continua-
tion benefits for a subsequent unrelated accident or illness when he or she returns
to work after recovering from the injuries sustained in the motor vehicle accident;
2) benefits for a subsequent unrelated accident must be equal in both time
and amount to the wage continuation benefits the applicant was entitled to as a
result of the injuries suffered in the motor vehicle accident; and
3) wage continuation benefits for a subsequent disability must be immedi-
ately available, without any requirement that the applicant work a stated period
of time before full benefits are restored. If these three conditions are met, the plan
probably qualifies.
N.Y. STATE INS. DEPT, Supp. No. 2 (issued Oct. 29, 1982) TO Cmc. LErTER No. 16 (1981)
(emphasis in original).
In applying these criteria to the Bristol Lab Wage Continuation plan, the Insurance
Department found that plan to be non-qualified. The Department Official noted that
there is the possibility that the level of benefits available to compensate for a later unre-
lated injury will be affected by the amount recoverable for the initial injury since unre-
lated injuries occuring within a six month period are treated as one disability. See Letter
from State of New York Insurance Department to Hanover Insurance Company (Sept.
21, 1981) (available in Pace Law Review office). Moreover, benefits may not be immedi-
ately available for subsequent illness or injury. Cf. Letter from State of New York Insur-
ance Department to State Farm Insurance Company (March 5, 1982). This letter con-
cluded that the wage continuation plan of Motorola, Inc. was qualified. Two aspects
cited as being important were: (1) the total number of days a covered employee is out
due to the same or related cause will be considered only one period of disability, and (2)
an employee who utilizes coverage pursuant to this policy will not suffer any loss of
future rights. Id.
229. See, e.g., Cady, 113 Misc. 2d at 1082, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 681 (Court did not allow
offset to work loss based on employee's wage continuation plan because the victim, al-
though receiving benefits from his employer, was drawing from accrued sick leave and
vacation time.). See also N.Y. No-FAULT AiB. REP., NF-772 (1980) (When employer
credited the victim with vacation days, arbitrator did not offset amount recovered
against work loss benefits because claimant was "deprived of days that he would other-
wise have had as vacation days.").
230. See supra note 228.
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premium rate adjustment.23 ' Adjustments to benefits are calcu-
lated by reducing the aggregate loss of income by the amount
received under a qualified plan.232 If a claimant has suffered a
loss in income which exceeds his wage continuation benefits, he
will be able to collect his wage continuation benefits as well as
the maximum work loss benefits.2 "
Although there is little authority explaining why wage con-
tinuation and workers' compensation offsets are handled differ-
ently,3 4 one explanation may be that lawmakers have sought to
encourage employer plans in order to relieve some of the burden
from the no-fault system. However, the difference in offset
methods can lead to inequitable results if two identical victims
seek benefits, and the only difference between the two is that
one receives workers' compensation and the other receives em-
ployer provided benefits.
The New York scheme could avoid such inequities by
adopting a policy that all collateral benefits for which premium
costs have been equalized are used to reduce no-fault policy lim-
its. " In doing so, no insured will be able to pay lower premiums
without suffering a corresponding reduction in no-fault protec-
tion. This approach is necessary since a compulsory system such
as New York's must strive to rid itself of waste and duplication
or it will compel motorists to purchase insurance that is
unaffordable.3 6
231. See N.Y. STATE INS. DEP'T CIRC. LETTER No. 13 (1977) (available in Pace Law
Review office).
232. See N.Y. STATE INS. DEP'T Coc. LETTER No. 16 (1981) (available in Pace Law
Review office). Calculation would be as follows: Aggregate income minus "Wage Continu-
ation Benefits" equals amount available for no-fault benefits. Id.
233. See id.
234. See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text. Cf. Prax, 322 N.W.2d at 754-
55. The Prax court indicated that when an insured receives a premium rate adjustment
to account for wage continuation it would be proper to subtract such amounts from pol-
icy limits. Id.
235. See Prax, 322 N.W.2d at 754-55; see also REPORT To GOVERNOR, supra note 1,
at 30-31 (discussing the importance of coordinating collateral sources of insurance and
equalizing premium costs). Cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.7372 (West Supp. 1984) (providing
for collateral source offset without rate equalization).




V. Modification of No-Fault Awards
Both the insurer and the insured will often have a financial
stake in the events that occur after an initial work loss award
determination. Since work loss benefits are paid as the loss is
incurred," 7 the insurer and the victim may maintain continued
contact for several years.2 38 It is common for either the victim or
the insurer to seek a modification of an award to account for a
change in circumstances in order to reflect the actual loss
accurately."3 '
A. Jurisdictional Overview
The only modifying condition expressly provided for in sev-
eral work loss statutes is the insurer's right to adjust benefits to
reflect the victim's unreasonable failure to undertake available
substitute work.2 4 Such laws force a victim to mitigate damages
before a recovery will be permitted.4 1
Some courts have also expressed a willingness to reopen and
modify prior awards for other reasons. A Pennsylvania court
noted that an award may be amended to account for an increase
in the minimum wage rate. 42 The court concluded that an ad-
justment to work loss benefits might be warranted in order to
reflect the victim's loss accurately.2 43 In contrast, at least one
Michigan court has voiced the concern that modifying awards
could "complicate the Legislature's simple plan for speedy pay-
ments of benefits. ' 244 This decision, however, has been overruled
237. See N.Y. INs. LAW § 675(1) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
238. See id. § 671(1)(b). New York work loss benefits may extend 36 months. Id.
239. See Goebel v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 458 A.2d 212 (Pa. Super. 1983). The
victim sought to increase work loss benefits because the minimum wage had increased.
Id. See also Nawrocki v. Hawkeye Sec. Ins. Co., 83 Mich. App. 135, 268 N.W.2d 317
(1978) (Insurer sought to terminate victim's benefits when victim's employer fired the
victim because of his disability.).
240. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-41-03(21) (Supp. 1983); Pa. Law, repealed 1984,
supra note 58. See also N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 65.15(n)(2)(viii) (1982) (noting that
claimant may suffer reduced benefits when he refuses to seek reasonable rehabilitative
treatment).
241. See Casson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 455 A.2d 361, 365-66 (Del. Super. 1982). An
injured victim has a duty to mitigate damages by seeking substitute employment. Id.
242. Goebel v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 458 A.2d 212 (Pa. Super. 1983).
243. Id. at 216.




by the Michigan Supreme Court.2 4'
B. The New York Approach
New York courts tend to favor award modification. As noted
in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Brooks,2 46
modification is often necessary to limit work loss recoveries to
the actual loss sustained.247 In Brooks, the claimant had been
injured in an automobile accident on August 24, 1976 and began
receiving work loss benefits. On October 3, 1976, Brooks was no-
tified that he would be laid off because of a lack of work for
laborers, not because of his injury.248 The insurer sought to re-
duce his work loss benefits.2 49 The court allowed the modifica-
tion, reasoning that the initial award no longer reflected the ac-
tual loss.250 Therefore, he would realize a windfall if his benefits
reflected a higher level of earnings than he would have been
earning had he not been injured. 51 It may be inferred from
Brooks that a person who loses his job for a reason unrelated to
his injury is no different from any other unemployed person be-
cause there is no causal link between the injury and the
unemployment.25 2
Applying the Brooks reasoning the Civil Court of the City of
New York in Herman v. GEICO,253 held that a claimant who
848, 849 (1981), rev'd, 419 Mich. 146, 350 N.W.2d 233 (1984).
245. MacDonald v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 419 Mich. 146, 350 N.W.2d at 235,
rev'g 108 Mich. App. 706, 310 N.W.2d 848 (1981).
246. 78 A.D.2d 456, 435 N.Y.S.2d 419 (4th Dep't 1981).
247. Id. at 459, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
248. Id. at 457, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
249. Id.
250. See id. at 459-60, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 422. A claimant may avoid a modification of
his work loss benefits if he is able to prove that he would have been able to obtain
substitute work. Id. at 459, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
See also 5 N.Y. No-FAULT Aim. REP., NF-841 (1981). The arbitrator did not deny a
union worker work loss even though his union subsequently went on strike. The claimant
was able to establish that he would have been placed in a substitute job with a competi-
tor because of his seniority in the union. Id. Cf. Erie Ins. Exch. v. Roule, 279 Pa. Super.
40, 420 A.2d 733 (1980) (Claimant need only prove that injury pulled him out of the
work force, not that he would have been able to obtain substitute work during labor
strike.).
251. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brooks, 78 A.D.2d 456, 459-60, 435 N.Y.S.2d 419,
422 (4th Dep't 1979).
252. See id.




loses his job because of his disability is entitled to collect work
loss benefits until he regains employment.254 Herman, despite
diligent efforts to obtain employment once he regained his
health, was unable to find work for nearly four months.2 5' In
awarding Herman work loss benefits the court stated that it was
the injury that caused the loss of earnings and, even though the
injury may have healed, it continued to cause a loss of income
until the claimant was once again employed.2 56
The rule enunciated in Herman does not follow prior ad-
ministrative rulings that limited work loss to the period of disa-
bility despite the fact that a victim remained unemployed for a
longer period.23 7 The Herman rule, however, has been espoused
in Michigan 58 and is likely to become the prevailing law if the
courts continue to base work loss benefits on the actual loss
analysis relied on in the Brooks decision.2 59 Just as it would be
grossly unfair to allow a victim who is laid off to collect work
loss benefits when his disability did not actually cause his lost
earnings, it would be similarly inequitable to deny a claimant
continued work loss benefits when his disability actually was the
cause of his lost earnings. In both circumstances, benefits are
linked to the loss actually caused by the accident.
The Herman and Brooks decisions suggest that there is a
need to consider events after an initial award determination to
avoid inequity through modification of the award. But, contin-
ued judicial review of work loss determinations might become
unduly complicated and defeat the efficiency of the no-fault sys-
tem. Consequently, modification should be permitted only when
the amount in controversy is significant.
254. Id. at 149, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
255. Id. at 146, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 200.
256. Id. at 149, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 202.
257. N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 65.15(n)(2)(v) (1982). The Herman court appar-
ently disregarded the New York State Insurance Department rule that enables a claim-
ant who is dismissed from his job because of his disability to continue receiving work loss
benefits only until the disability is lifted, not until he finds another job. Id. Recent arbi-
tration decisions have gone both ways on this issue. See, e.g., 8 N.Y. No-FAULT Aim.
REP., NF-1241 (1984) (Arbitrator cited to and ruled in accordance with the Herman deci-
sion.); cf. 7 N.Y. No-FAULT ARB. REP., NF-1116 (1983) (Arbitrator ruled in accordance
with Insurance Department rule.).
258. Nawrocki v. Hawkeye Sec. Ins. Co., 83 Mich. App. 135, 268 N.W.2d 317 (1978).
See also Coates v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 105 Mich. App. 290, 306 N.W.2d 484 (1981).





The Legislature enacted section 671(1)(b) 2"0 to provide auto
accident victims with compensation for actual lost earnings
caused by disability resulting from an automobile accident. This
work loss law was intended to maximize protection for the vic-
tim and minimize the cost of auto insurance.
In reviewing how various claimants fare under the New
York work loss law, it is apparent that the statutory goals have
yet to be wholly fulfilled. In limiting benefits to actual loss, the
law may have unfairly foreclosed all sources of recompense to
certain unemployed victims. Moreover, it has failed to provide
adequate guidance for measuring the claims of self-employed
victims, thereby opening the door to imprecise and speculative
determinations. Both problems could be resolved by amend-
ments that define work loss more precisely.
The New York law needs a more consistent policy regarding
offsets and deductions. In order to avoid duplicating benefits, all
collateral sources of benefits should be taken into account and
any adjustment for collateral benefits should be deducted from
no-fault policy limits. This treatment of collateral sources would
shift the cost of higher levels of insurance coverage to those who
can better afford to pay the premiums.
Finally, events that occur after initial work loss determina-
tions and that significantly alter original work loss assessments
must be reflected in award modifications. It is critical that each
award of work loss benefits be based on accurate estimations of
a victim's lost earnings so that motorists will not be unnecessa-
rily burdened with higher insurance costs.
Kent S. Nevins
260. N.Y. INs. LAw § 671(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
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